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Eavesdropping and the Constitution:
A Reappraisal of the
Fourth Amendment Framework
The Supreme Court's treatment of eavesdropping has been predicated upon a -restrictiveconstruction of the fourth amendment and
three lines of analysis suggested in Olmstead v. United States. Since
subsequent decisions have cast doubt upon the continued viability of
the lines of analysis, pressure has mounted for a reconsiderationof the
entire constitutionalframework for the treatment of eavesdropping. The
author of this Note, after tracing the pattern of decisions under the
Court's present rationale, discusses several proposed frameworks utilizing other provisions of the Constitution than the fourth amendment.
In conclusion it is suggested that a redefinition of the fourth amendment would provide the most suitable constitutionalframework for the
treatment of eavesdropping.

For forty years the subject of eavesdropping has been belabored by each of the three branches of the federal government,1

by the states,2 and by scholars3 and various interest groups.4 In
spite of such efforts, however, problems posed by the practice of
eavesdropping remain unsolved. Pressing the Supreme Court to

reevaluate its position on the constitutional questions presented

by eavesdropping are powerful factors: concern for the individual
rights which eavesdropping is said to violate; technological advances in the field of electronics; the failure of Congress to pro-

vide a legislative solution; and, most important, the inadequacy
of the Court's traditional constitutional basis for the treatment
of eavesdropping.
The purpose of this Note is to undertake an analysis of the

problems posed by eavesdropping and to suggest an appropriate
1. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); SuBcommuTrE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED
STATES SENATE, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING: SUMMARY-REPORT OF
HEARINGS 1958-1961 (1963); Katzenbach, An Approach to the Problems of

Wiretapping, 32 F.R.D. 107 (1963).

2. See, e.g., JOINT LEGISLATIVE ComnarHE ON PRIVACY OF CoMIwuNicATIONS AND LIcmsURE OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS, NEw YoRK STATE LEGISLATURE, A REPORT (1957-1962); JUDICIARY Co=MnTTE
OF THE CALIFORNIA
SENATE, REPORT ON THE INTERCEPTION OF MESSAGES BY THE USE OF ELECTRoNIc Aw OTER DEVICES (1957).

3. See, e.g., Dilworth & Dash, A Wire Tap Proposal,59 DICK. L. REV. 195
(1955); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 65 (1957).
4. See, e.g., AmEcAN CIVIL LISERTIEs UNION, THE WIRETAPPING PROBLEM TODAY: A REPORT (1962).
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constitutional framework for their solution. Contrary to most
discussions in this area, this Note will neither take a position on
the merits- i.e., on the extent to which eavesdropping should
be permitted- nor recommend that a suitable constitutional
rationale be devised under provisions of the Constitution other
than the fourth amendment.5 Those assertions upon which responsible commentators appear to agree will be accepted, and it
will be suggested that eavesdropping may be most satisfactorily
dealt with under the fourth amendment.
I.

THE PROBLEMS POSED BY EAVESDROPPING

To facilitate meaningful analysis of a proposed constitutional
rationale, it is essential that analytical difficulties attributable to
the use of ambiguous terms and emotional arguments be appreciated. Modem eavesdropping techniques will require brief consideration, and areas of agreement among the divergent views on
the merits of eavesdropping will be explored.
A.

ANALYTiCAL PROBLMS

First, since eavesdropping obviously interferes with "privacy,"
objections to the use of eavesdropping techniques have relied on
"the individual's right to privacy." The Supreme Court, however,
has never undertaken a comprehensive definition of "privacy," nor
is the term anywhere defined or even explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution. Attempting a definition is beyond the scope of
this Note, 6 and because use of the term is unavoidable, especially
in considering the development of the present constitutional
treatment of eavesdropping under the fourth amendment, the
limitations imposed by the absence of a definition must be kept
in mind.
A second source of difficulty is that policy considerations
have been distorted by the assumption that any constitutional
solution devised by the Court must be an all or nothing proposition. Proponents of both extreme positions- those favoring
an absolute prohibition of eavesdropping and those favoring its
unrestricted use- point to the obvious dangers of either foster5. E.g., King, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected ConstitutionalConsideration, 66 Dic. L. REv. 17 (1961); Note, 12 Am. U.L. REv.
83 (1963); Note, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1496 (1963); Note, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
735 (1959); Comment, 59 Nw. UJL. R v. 632 (1964). But see Comment, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 142, 152 (1964).
6. See generally Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacj in the Suprerne Court, 1962 Sup. CT. Rnv. 212.
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ing a police state or allowing criminals to operate virtually unchecked. Obviously neither solution is necessary to avoid the
dangers of the opposite solution.
Finally, eavesdropping includes three police functions which
are indistinguishable in principle but which typically are neither
clearly differentiated nor treated under one consistent rationale.
These three functions are: eavesdropping in the traditional sense
using only the physical senses of sight or hearing; electronic surveillance- eavesdropping aided by electronic devices; and wiretapping.
It has been argued that wiretapping and electronic surveillance
should receive distinct treatment 7 Wiretapping, the argument
states, is a significantly limited form of eavesdropping because it
monitors only telephone conversation in which the public does
not speak freely because of long experience with party lines, secretaries and operators. Thus, it does not pose as serious a threat
to "privacy" as does electronic surveillance, and the considerations underlying its analysis should be different. Although such
a distinction may be meaningful in devising an appropriate legislative remedy, wiretapping is but one incident of the broader
category of electronic surveillance and should be treated as such
under a constitutional analysis, any qualitative difference going
only to the reasonableness of employing the particular method
of eavesdropping in a given factual situation.
Traditional eavesdropping techniques have been treated under
the warrants provision of the fourth amendment. Since few
troublesome conceptual problems have arisen, 9 it would seem
that a comprehensive constitutional framework for eavesdropping
should preserve a substantially similar treatment of traditional
7. See Kamisar, The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem: A Professor's
View, 44 Mw'. L. :Rv. 891, 891 (1960); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 72; Williams,
The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem. A Defense Counsel's View, 44
MmN. L. REV. 855, 864-66 (1960).
8. See Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103
U. PA. L. Ruv. 157 (1954); Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis
and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLvm. L. REv. 165 (1959).
9. Traditional techniques have, however, provoked comments laden with
moral indignation:
Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of
a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable at
the court-leet: or are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine
and finding sureties for the good behavior.
4 BLACKSTONE, ColYnYxTAEs* 169. For a famous characterization of eavesdropping as "dirty business," see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 488,
469-71 (1928) (Holmes, 3., dissenting).
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techniques. Thus, the contemporary constitutional difficulties

with eavesdropping essentially are raised by the technology of
electronic surveillance.
B.

TEcHNoLoGIcAL

INNOVATIONS

With the development of miniaturized circuits, the methods of
eavesdropping have become incredibly subtle.'0 It is now possible
to overhear conversation held within a closed room by using a
device which makes use of the vibrations in a window pane as it
responds to sounds from within. Tubular and parabolic microphones can intercept conversations held hundreds of yards away.
Acoustic engineers predict that systems will soon be operable
which utilize ultrasonic or electromagnetic waves to penetrate
virtually any structural material and monitor conversation held
within. Conversation may be monitored from within a room by
such Machiavellian devices as wireless transmitters the size of
sugar cubes or transmitters disguised as martini olives which
transmit sounds via their toothpick aerials. Even wiretapping has
developed new subtleties with the invention of devices which
monitor telephone conversations by the inductive effect of electromagnetic waves emanating from the current flowing through telephone lines, thus obviating any need to connect directly into the
wire. Electronic visual devices, such as miniature television cameras, have become equally sophisticated; although the problem
posed by use of such devices has yet to come before the Court,"
it must be recognized that they are at least as controversial as
the auditory devices giving rise to the present problems. It now
appears that the only way to be safe from eavesdropping is to
hold all conversations inside a tent-like enclosure, or to line the
room with aluminum foil and use special glass panes in all

windows.
C. THE

DIVERGENT VIEWS

The use of devices for electronic surveillance has been viewed
from three general positions: absolute prohibition; unrestricted
10. See generally BRETON, Trm PRivAcY INVADERS (1964); DASH, SCHWARTZ
& KNowLToN, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959). The subsequent discussion is based

largely upon information contained in these sources.
11. The use of visual aids has never been seriously questioned. See United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (use of a searchlight at night); Hodges v.
United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957) (use of binoculars); Comment,
52 CAi4.

L. REV. 142, 147 (1964).
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use; and limited, controlled use. 12 Determining what aspects of
eavesdropping are agreed upon by responsible advocates of all
positions may furnish a substantial basis for an acceptable
rationale which would commend itself to the public and to police
officials as well as to the judiciary.
The most significant of these areas of agreement is that the
empirical data needed for sound conclusions has not yet been
compiled.13 Indeed, such data may never be presented because of
the secrecy attending the use of eavesdropping tchniques and the
disfavor with which such techniques have invariably been viewed.
It is essential to recognize, therefore, that the extreme positions
which rely heavily upon conjecture are not likely to deserve
consideration.
All agree that the unlimited use of eavesdropping techniques
is both oppressive and generally unnecessary. 4 No responsible
group fully defends the propriety of using eavesdropping devices,
in the discretion of police officers, to monitor all conversations in
private homes. On the other hand, each position recognizes the
importance to the police function of some utilization of eavesdropping techniques - traditional techniques in most cases, and
contemporary techniques in the investigation of certain "vice"
offenses, such as narcotics, gambling, and prostitution, where
there commonly are no complaining victims or witnesses to
present evidence and where elaborate secrecy precautions usually
are taken to conceal such activity. 5 Although there may be
disagreement as to whether the disadvantages of eavesdropping
outweigh its advantages even in these limited areas, each position concedes that such a balancing of interests is essential to a
proper resolution of the issues.
Finally, there is agreement that regardless of the law police
probably will continue to utilize eavesdropping techniques. One
12. See generally Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping
Controversy, 63 YALE L.i. 799 (1954); Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping,
63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954).
13. See, e.g., Hennings, The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem: A Legislator'sView, 44 MNN. L. REv. 813, 818 (1960); Westin, supra note 8, at 191.
14. For a full gamut of such views, see The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping
Problem, 44 MnNr. L. REv. 813 (1960).
15. See DEUTSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH THE Cops 75 (1955); SMITH, POLICE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 285-87 (1940); Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 38-39; Allen,
The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal
J.ustice, 82 SocIAL SERVICE REV. 107, 112 (1958); Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv.
493, 501 (1952).
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reason for this is the singular public pressure upon the police to
curtail those "vice" activities in the investigation of which eavesdropping techniques are most required." Another reason for
police recalcitrance is the lack of an effective sanction for violation of eavesdropping laws. 7 The exclusionary rule, barring the
use as evidence of matter illegally obtained, deters only conviction-oriented police eavesdropping;18 activity intended to harass
or to prevent criminal behavior remains unaffected.' 9 Moreover,
even the protection afforded by the exclusionary rule in traditional search and seizure cases may be unavailable in eavesdropping cases; eavesdropping may take place without the defendant's kmowledge, and it may result in leads rather than
tangible evidence which could be suppressed at trial.
However, it is not to be inferred that police recalcitrance and
the lack of definitive empirical data make the argument over the
proper constitutional treatment of eavesdropping mere cavil.
Public attitudes and police practices are molded by the posture
of legality in which those attitudes and practices are placed. °
16. It has been suggested that society, by defining such activity as criminal and demanding that the police check its incidence, has implicitly demanded
the use of eavesdropping devices. See Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the
American Law of Search and Seizure, in PoLIcE PowR AND INDirmuAL
FREDOm 77 (Sowle ed. 1962); Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment
A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT. Rnv. 1, s8.

17. Criminal violations of eavesdropping laws go unprosecuted in virtually
all cases because of the necessity that the prosecutor work closely with the
police and refrain from antagonizing them with such prosecutions. Tort remedies conferring a right of action upon the aggrieved individual as against
either the offending police officer or the governmental unit are unsuccessful
for a variety of reasons-chiefly the difficulty of determining damages and
the unwillingness of jurors to award damages as against policemen or police
departments in favor of plaintiffs who are likely to be viewed as criminals.

See generally Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal SearchesA Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAm'. L. I~v. 565 (1955); Foote, Tort
Remedies for Police Violation of Individual Rights, 39 M.WN. L. REV. 493
(1955); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 72-74; Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493
(1952).
18. See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,and the Civil
Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950).

19. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in
PoLIcE PowER AN INDIVIDUAL FRmEoi 87 (Sowle ed. 1962). Indeed, it has
been suggested that the exclusionary rule may force police to turn from
conviction-oriented activity to less desirable "informal" methods of crime
prevention. See id. at 90; Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Momn. L.
REV. 169, 193-96 (1955).

20. See, e.g., Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J.
133 (1953); Kamisar, supra note 7, at 933; Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1952).
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Since a decision upon the merits of eavesdropping must be assumed to have its most significant effect in this indirect manner,
any constitutional framework for decision must provide well
defined and intelligible guidelines.
Furthermore, the lack of empirical data does not excuse the
judiciary from determining the issues of eavesdropping confronting them. The lack of empirical data is surely one of the main
reasons why Congress has been unable to deal with the problem, 21
but the failure of a legislative solution only presses the courts
more insistently for a determination of the issues. The necessity
of basing decisions upon premature conclusions indicates, however, that any suitable constitutional framework should be flexible enough to accommodate future compilations of empirical
data.
H.

THE PRESENT TREATMENT OF EAVESDROPPING
UNDER TE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The consideration of a suitable constitutional basis for the
treatment of eavesdropping requires an examination of the development of its present treatment under the fourth amendment.
Such an examination reveals that the Court's difficulties with
the fourth amendment stem not only from the unsuitable nature
of its traditional lines of analysis, but also from its failure to
reconsider, as it rejected those lines of analysis, the construction
of the fourth amendment.upon which they were predicated.

A.

OLmsT AD AND ITS PROGENY

The existing constitutional treatment of modern eavesdropping
techniques is based upon lines of analysis suggested in Olmstead
v. United States.22 Olmstead and others were convicted of conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. Evidence essential to their conviction had been obtained by wiretaps on the
residence telephones of four of the conspirators and on the telephone in their main business office. Olmstead contended that the
wiretap violated his rights under both the fourth and fifth amendments.
A majority of the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft,
rejected Olmstead's contention on three grounds. First, the fourth
amendment was said to protect against seizures of tangible things
only, not against the interception of conversation. This proposi21. See Hennings, supra note 18, at 816-22.
22. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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tion was derived from the requirement of the fourth amendment
that warrants describe with particularity the objects to be
seized.23 Second, the protection of the fourth amendment was
said to extend only to those cases in which the seizure of evidence
was accompanied by an actual trespass upon the property of the
objecting party, not to the telephone lines which were outside
Ohnstead's premises. This proposition was derived from the historical purpose of the fourth amendment to protect against invasions of the home by soldiers of the Crown under the auspices
of general warrants or writs of assistance.2 4 Third, Olmstead had
engaged in a voluntary conversation and had intended that his
voice be projected outside the confines of his home and office;
the conversation, when travelling upon the telephone lines, could
not be protected under the fourth amendment. 2 5 Though the
basis for the third proposition is not clear, several possible sources
may be suggested. Most likely, this proposition was meant to
indicate that the protection of the fourth amendment was confined to narrow geographical surroundings. Another source may
be found in the majority's suggestion that the fourth amendment
protects only against searches and seizures which are contrary to
the will of the offended party; since Olmstead engaged in the
conversation with the intention that it be projected to outsiders,
the eavesdropping could not be against his will. Finally, the third
proposition may have been in answer to a fifth amendment contention which the majority previously rejected; it had been
argued that the introduction of evidence obtained from the wiretap was tantamount to compelling the conspirators to give evidence against themselves.2 8 By stressing the voluntariness of
Olmstead's conversation, Chief Justice Taft may have sought to
dispel any troublesome notions of coerced confessions.
Mr. Justice Butler, objecting specifically to the literal interpretation espoused by the majority, would have found the wiretap to be a violation of the fourth amendment. 27 Mr. Justice
23. Id. at 464.
24. Id. at 463; see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HAnv. L.
REv. 361 (1921).

25. 277 U.S. at 466.
26. Id. at 443.
27.
This Court has always construed the Constitution in the light of the
principles upon which it was founded. The direct operation or literal
meaning of the words used do not measure the purpose or scope of its
provisions. Under the principles established and applied by this Court,
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Brandeis devoted his dissent primarily to defining the relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments and the proper
relation of eavesdropping to each of themFs Although he rejected
the contention that eavesdropping might be struck down on the
basis of the fifth amendment's prohibition against the use of
coerced confessions, he would have found ample grounds to condemn it in the fourth amendment as well as in a "union" of the
fourth and fifth.
Defining the scope of the fourth amendment, Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.... They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone- the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 9

The role of the fifth amendment with respect to the fourth as
thus defined was to protect the individual from the use in evidence against him of facts obtained by such an intrusion.
Brandeis based his concept of the "union" of the fourth and
fifth amendments upon broad language in Boyd v. United States,-0
referring to the views expressed by Lord Camden in Entick v.
3 ' the Boyd
Carrington,
Court had stated:
the Fourth Amendment safeguards against all evils that are like and
equivalent to those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words.
ld. at 487-88.
28. Brandeis would also have condemned the admission of the evidence
because, in obtaining it through the use of the wiretap, the federal officers
violated state law. Id. at 469-71. Justices Holmes and Stone, dissenting, agreed
with this ground of the Brandeis opinion, even though the issue was not
properly raised under the certiorari order. See id. at 479-85, 488.
29. Id. at 478.
30. 116 U.S. 616 (1885). Boyd involved a challenge to the constitutionality
of a statutory provision of the federal revenue laws which provided that in
forfeiture proceedings instituted for the alleged nonpayment of import duties,
the court might issue a notice to defendants requiring the production of
relevant books and records. Upon the failure of the defendant to comply with
the notice, the allegations of the government as to the contents of the papers
were taken to be confessed by the defendant. The Court struck down the
statute on the ground that it violated both the fourth and fifth amendments.
31. 19 How. St. Tri. 1030, 75 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). Entick involved an
action in trespass against officers of the Crown who had searched plaintiff's
home and seized his private papers pursuant to a general executive warrant
charging him with seditious libel. The question presented was whether a warrant to search and seize a citizen's private papers could ever be lawful. Lord
Camden held for the plaintiff on the ground that only the guilt of the individ-
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The principles [of the fourth and fifth amendments] laid down in this
opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security....
[T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the Government and its
employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, -it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a
house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation;
but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evidence of a crime or to forfeit
his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard
32
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.

Such a broad interpretation of the fourth and fifth amendments, however mystical the basis, was needed to define a general
right of privacy and to free tests of eavesdropping from the trespass requirement because, said Brandeis, science had devised
"subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy"3 3 than
the methods existing at the time of the framing of the Constitution.
The Olmstead opinions, by rejecting the proffered "mystical
union" between the fourth and fifth amendments and its attendant broad right of "privacy," as well as the coerced confession
argument under the fifth amendment, focused consideration solely
upon the fourth amendment. But more importantly, the majority
opinion implicitly determined the construction of the text of the
fourth amendment which was to influence subsequent decisions.
The text of the amendment is divided into two clauses, the reasonableness clause3 4 and the warrants clause; 35 a literal reading
ual could justify a trespass upon his property and the seizure of his goods; a
search for incriminating evidence like the search which the officers made did
not justify the trespass: "I wish some cases had been shewn, where the law
forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by process .... In the criminal
law such a proceeding was never heard of .... (O)ur law has provided no
paper-search in these cases to help forward the conviction." Id. at 1078. (The
quoted material appears only in the original report of the case.)
32. 277 U.S. at 474-75, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630

(1885).
33. 277 U.S. at 473. He warned that, "the progress of science in furnishing
the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping." Id. at 474.
34. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
....
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. "[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
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implies that search and seizure must be reasonable, and if conducted pursuant to a warrant, must meet certain enumerated
qualifications. However, the majority in Olmstead obviated any
independent significance of the reasonableness clause by reading
the enumerated qualifications of the warrants clause as a sine
qua non of reasonableness. A literal, historically-based interpretation of the warrants clause directed consideration away from a
rational definition of "privacy" or a balancing of interests toward
such technical factors as physical trespass.
The Court's opinion in Olmstead was greeted with little
charity 3 The widely felt adverse reaction may have been responsible in part for the passage of the Federal Communications Act 37
some seven years later, although the legislative history of this
Act reveals little concrete evidence of such a cause-effect relationship.8 Nevertheless, the Court seized upon section 605 of the
Act and interpreted it to foreclose wiretapping by federal agents
on grounds which seem inconsistent with Olmstead:
Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders should
go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods
deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal
liberty. The same considerations may well have moved Congress to
adopt § 605 as evoked the guaranty against practices and procedures
violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
of the Constitution.s9

In a series of subsequent decisions construing section 605, the
Court in effect "poured the40 Fourth Amendment into the Federal Communications Act"
These results suggest that, although the Court was chary of
broadly defining the fourth amendment to restrict eavesdropping,4 1 it was equally reluctant to allow unrestricted eavesby oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. See Black, An 11-Starred Prohibition Case, 18 GEO. LJ. 120 (1930);
28 CoLum. L. Rzv. 669 (1928); 41 EAnv. L. Rav. 258 (1927); 77 U. PA. L. REv.
189 (1928); 15 VA. L. Rav. 62 (1928).
37. 48 Stat. § 1103 (193), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
38. The managers of the bill stated that it was designed only to transfer
control over communications to a new agency, the Federal Communications
Commission, and that "the bill as a whole does not change existing law." 78
Cong. Rec. 10313 (1934).
39. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
40. Westin, .supra note 8, at 177. See generally id. at 178-81; Donnelly,
.supranote 12, at 803-804.
41. It has been suggested that the period of national prohibition was an
inopportune time to press for recognition of a broad doctrine of personal
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dropping outside the boundaries of fourth amendment protection.
In any event, disposition of wiretapping cases under section 605
delayed further constitutional arguments about eavesdropping
until Goldman v. United States.4
Petitioners in Goldman were convicted of conspiring to violate
the National Bankruptcy Act through a scheme to retain a secret
profit on the sale of debtors' estates. Government agents had
planted a microphone in the office of petitioner Shulman designed
to broadcast conversation to a recording device in an adjacent
office. This device failed to work, but the agents were able to
overhear Shulman's conversations with Goldman and others by
the use of a detectaphone placed against the partition wall between the adjoining offices. Petitioners urged that use of evidence
43
thus obtained violated their rights under the fourth amendment.
A majority of the Court flatly rejected the claim that the
trespass tainted evidence obtained by use of the detectaphone;
the trespass was wholly unconnected with its use and could not
possibly be considered a sufficient ground to bar such evidence.
Utilization of the detectaphone was upheld under the fourth
amendment because no trespass was incident thereto. Of greater
significance, however, was the majority's treatment of Olmstead;
in adhering to its opinion they refused to distinguish the cases
upon the ground that in Olmsteadthere was an intention to project
the voice beyond the room, whereas in the instant case the conversations were intended to remain within." Although the maprivacy; the fact that search and seizure rules were invoked most often in
favor of persons engaged in large scale criminal activities, often by judges
unsympathetic to prohibition, could not escape the attention of other judges,
such as Chief Justice Taft, who were disturbed by the growth of crime.
Olm0tead may well have been "the high point of Taft's crusade" for strict
enforcement of prohibition. Beaney, supra note 6, at 218.
42. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
43. As applied to Shulman's talk into the telephone receiver which was
also overheard by means of the detectaphone, petitioners contended that admission of evidence thus obtained violated § 605 of the Federal Communications Act. This contention was rejected on the ground that § 605 protects only
"the message itself throughout the course of transmission by the instrumentality or agency of transmission." Id. at 18.
44. The dissenters agreed that Olmstead was indistinguishable; Justices
Stone and Frankfurter would have overruled it on the basis of the dissenting
opinions there expressed, while Mr. Justice Murphy, in a dissent reminiscent
of Brandeis' in Olmatead, advocated a broad interpretation of the fourth
amendment to prohibit eavesdropping without the requirement of trespass.
The latter found support for his position in the intentions of the framers:
There was no physical entry in this case. But the search of one's home
or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has brought forth
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jority might have said that the distinction was not of controlling
significance in light of the other two bases for the Olmstead
decision, they instead disposed entirely of the distinction:
We think, however, the distinction is too nice for practical application of the Constitutional guarantee, and no reasonable or logical distinction can be drawn between what federal agents
did in the present
5
case, and state officers did in the Omtead case.

The proposition that the fourth amendment prohibits the
seizure of tangible objects only was the next basis of the Olmstead
46 and again
decision to be undermined, first in Irvine v. California,
47
in Silverman v. United States.
Suspecting Irvine of being engaged in illegal gambling activities, police employed a locksmith to make a key to the door of his
house. Two days later, police entered with the key and concealed
a microphone in a hall, boring a hole in the roof through which
wires were strung to a neighboring garage where officers monitored Irvine's conversations. Police entered Irvine's house on two
subsequent occasions, moving the microphone first to his bedroom
and then to a closet, where it remained until the investigation
ended.
The Supreme Court found that Irvine's rights under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments were violated by the "almost incredible" police measures. 8 By necessary implication, therefore,
the tangibility requirement was rejected, and although the plurality represented the views of only four Justices, neither Mr. Justice
Clark concurring nor the four dissenting Justices mourned its
passing.49
far more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than
the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by
our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment. Surely the
spirit motivating the framers of that amendment would abhor these
new devices no less. Physical entry may be wholly immaterial.
316 U.S. at 139.
45. Id. at 135.
46. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
47. 865 U.S. 505 (1961).
48. 37 U.S. at 132. His conviction was affirmed, however, on the ground
that "subsidiary procedural and evidentiary doctrines developed by the federal courts," including the federal exclusionary rule, were not made limitations
upon the states by the fourteenth amendment. Ibid.
49. Justice Clark reluctantly concurred in the judgment of affirmance,
although he would have -preferred to apply the exclusionary rule to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 188. Justices Frankfurter and
Burton would have reversed on the ground that Irvine was deprived of due
process by the police measures, without reference to the fourth amendment
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In Silverman the Court likewise implicitly rejected the tangiibility limitation by deeming eavesdropping to violate the fourth
amendment. The Court refused, however, to reconsider either
Olmstead or Goldman and reaffirmed Olmstead's requirement of
physical trespass. After Silverman, then, only this basis of the
Olmstead decision retained any force, although the Court adhered to its underlying construction of the fourth amendment.
Moreover, a reading of Silverman with the recent decision of
the Court in Clinton v. Virginia0 indicates that the only remaining
line of analysis predicated upon the Olmstead construction of the
fourth amendment has been effectively rejected. In Silverman, the
Court condemned on the basis of the fourth amendment evidence
obtained by inserting a spike microphone several inches into a
party wall until it touched a heating duct which acted as a sounding board, enabling the police to overhear conversations throughout the petitioner's house. Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for a
majority, refused to consider pleas for both a broader construction of the fourth amendment and a reconsideration of Olmstead
and Goldman; nevertheless, his opinion partially abandoned the
"actual trespass" requirement of Olmstead:
[W]e need not pause to consider whether or not there was a technical
trespass under the local property law relating to party walls. Inherent
Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of
ancient niceties of tort or real property law.... [The] decision here does
not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a
matter of local law. It is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area. 51

In Clinton, any remaining life was drained from the actual
trespass requirement. Mrs. Clinton was convicted of receiving
the earnings of a prostitute. Evidence introduced at trial had
violation. Id. at 142. Justices Black and Douglas urged a different ground for
reversal; they viewed the Government requirement of a gambling tax stamp
and the required disclosure of certain information incident to obtaining the
stamp as a violation of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. Id. at 139. Justice Douglas also dissented separately urging application
of the exclusionary rule to the states. Id. at 149.
50. 877 U.S. 158 (1964), reversing per curiam 04 Va. 275, 130 S.E2d 437
(1963).
51. 365 U.S. at 511-12. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred with the majority
but would have gone much further and eliminated any reference to trespass
or physical intrusion: "[Ojur sole concern should be with whether the privacy
of the home was invaded." Id. at 513. Justices Clark and Whittaker wished
to retain the "actual trespass" basis of Olmstead and felt "obliged" to concur
only because in their view the majority had determined that the physical
penetration of the microphone constituted such a trespass.
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been obtained by monitoring conversations held in her apartment through the use in an adjacent apartment of an electronic
eavesdropping device which fastened to the wall by making no
greater penetration than a thumb tack. In a per curiam decision,
the Court reversed a judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court
upholding her conviction.5
The penetration made by the eavesdropping device in Clinton
affords no logical ground for distinguishing the case from Goldman, where conversations were monitored by placing a detectaphone against a partition wall. Yet the Court's failure to reconsider Goldman and its citation of Silverman in the per curiam
decision indicate that the penetration was of controlling significance. Such an application of the physical intrusion concept suggested in Silverman can be considered only a temporary means of
avoiding a reconsideration of the lines of analysis suggested in
Olmstead; the concept requires distinctions too nice for continued application. Thus the Court has condemned eavesdropping
in cases where there has manifestly been no actual trespass as
required by Olmstead, and where there has been only the most
picayune physical intrusion. None of the three lines of analysis
predicated upon the Olmstead construction of the fourth amendment retains any vitality; yet, the underlying construction remains unchanged. It seems clear that for this reason alone a
reconsideration of the fourth amendment is necessary, and that
its construction in Olmstead must either find new ground for
support or give way to a constitutional framework more consonant with the law of eavesdropping as it has been developed by
the Court.

B. ON Lm

AND

LOPZ: Tim BASTARD OWSPrn.G

An additional aspect of the current treatment of eavesdropping
requires attention. In On Lee v. United States"' and Lopez v.
United Statese4 the Court was confronted with the contention
that, despite the assent of one of the parties, the fourth amendment is violated by the use of electronic eavesdropping devices
to monitor and record conversation.
On Lee was a Hoboken entrepreneur who dealt in laundry and
52. Mr. Justice Clark concurred again on the basis of his belief that the
majority had considered the penetration sufficient to be an "actual trespass."
377 U.S. at 158. Mr. Justice White dissented without comment. Ibid.
53. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
54. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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8

narcotics. An old friend and former employee, Chin Poy, who had
become an informer for the Narcotics Bureau, entered his shop
and engaged On Lee in conversation. Unbeknown to On Lee, a
small microphone concealed upon the person of Chin Poy broadcast their conversation outside the shop where it was monitored
by a narcotics agent with a radio receiver. Conversation which
took place upon the sidewalks of New York was similarly monitored and, although Chin Poy was not called as a witness, the
agent was permitted to testify to the incriminating content of the
conversation at the trial which resulted in On Lee's conviction.
A majority of the Court refused to find a violation of the fourth
amendment, relying upon two of the bases of Olmstead- there
had been no physical trespass because On Lee had consented to
the entry of Chin Poy, and there had been no seizure of tangible
property. 5
Similar issues were presented in Lopez, where an agent of the
Internal Revenue Service investigating cabaret tax liability was
offered a bribe by the owner of an inn. The agent feigned willingness to accept the bribe and reported the incident to his superiors.
He returned with a concealed transmitter and wire recorder. The
transmitter failed, but the recording of the conversation was
admitted into evidence to corroborate the agent's testimony at
the trial which resulted in Lopez's conviction. Lopez contended
that his rights under the fourth amendment were violated both
by the agent's testimony and by the introduction of the recording.
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, rejected this
contention. He found it clear that, because the agent was present
with Lopez's consent, there was no constitutional inhibition
against his testimony. Once this fact was established, Harlan did
not have to reconsider previous eavesdropping cases:
55. The four dissenting opinions again resurrected the arguments of the
dissenters in Olmstead. ir. Justice Black would have forbade the use of the
agent's testimony on Holmes' moral grounds. 343 U.S. at 758. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter expressly adhered to the dissenting views in Olmstead, reiterating
the view that it should be overruled. Id. at 761. Mr. Justice Douglas argued
once again for a condemnation of such eavesdropping under a broad right to
privacy derived from the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 765. Mr. Justice
Burton's opinion, in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred, argued that
the fourth amendment had indeed been violated: because Chin Poy had no
permission from On Lee to carry the concealed transmitter, a trespass had
been committed exactly as if the narcotics agent had surreptitiously entered
the store; and the fourth amendment protection was not dependent upon the
tangibility of the evidence seized but rather upon the manner in which it was
obtained. Id. at 766-67.
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[Tlhis case involves no "eavesdropping" whatever in any proper sense
of that term. The government did not use any electronic device to listen
in on conversation it could not otherwise have heard. Instead, the device
was used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possible of a conversation in which the. Government's own agent was a participant and
which that agent was fully entitled to disclose.5 6

Mr. Justice Brennan, joined in a dissent by Justices Douglas
and Goldberg, advocated the overruling of Olmstead, On Lee and
Goldman, and a -redefinition of the constitutional framework for
the treatment of eavesdropping. This redefinition was to be accomplished by a recognition of a general right to privacy dictated
by the "mystical union" between the fourth and fifth amendments.5 7 In the view of the dissenters, any use of electronic devices

would be condemned by such a construction. Justification for this
result was extracted from the first amendment:
If electronic surveillance by government becomes sufficiently widespread, and there is little in prospect for checking it, the hazard that as
58
a people we may become hagridden and furtive is not fantasy.
On Lee and Lopez are thus of significance not only with respect
to the historical development of present law but also with respect
to possible changes in the constitutional framework for the treatment of eavesdropping. First, as Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out
in Lopez, each of these cases could have been distinguished on the
ground that there was in fact no eavesdropping. But in each,

fourth amendment issues would not be denied, indicating the
56. 373 U.S. at 439. Chief Justice Warren, concurring, would have drawn
a distinction between Lopez and On Lee by permitting the use of electronic
devices solely to corroborate the testimony of a witness who actually testified at the trial. The use of the device in On Lee would be condemned because
its purpose was to obviate the need to place Chin Poy upon the stand, which
Warren viewed as a violation of proper criminal procedure:
[W]hile I join the Court in permitting the use of electronic devices to
corroborate an agent under the particular facts of this case, I cannot
sanction by implicAtion the use of these same devices to radically shift
the pattern of presentation of evidence in the criminal trial, a shift that
may be used to conceal substantial factual and legal issues concerning
the rights of the accused and the administration of criminal justice.
Id. at 445-46.
57. The dissenters also advocated an independent recognition of the
reasonableness and warrants clauses of the fourth amendment. This proposition was advanced, however, only in support of the "mystical union" argum'ent; no independent analysis based upon the reasonableness clause of the
fourth amendment was suggested. See id. at 454-55; text accompanying notes
35 & 36 8upra.
58. 373 U.S. at 470.
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Court's discontent with and willingness to reconsider existing law.
The dissenters in Lopez recognize that not only the lines of analysis suggested by Olmstead but also its underlying construction of
the fourth amendment must be reconsidered; they also suggest
that an inquiry into the first amendment might prove helpful in
devising a suitable framework. And finally, the issues raised in
these cases suggest that any future treatment must contend with
the persuasive argument that electronic devices may be used to
preserve the most reliable evidence of conversations which could
be divulged by a participant 9
C.

LANZA

v. NEW YoRx: THm

CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED AREA

A final aspect of the present treatment of eavesdropping
under60the fourth amendment was articulated in Lanza v. New
York, where reference was made to an "area" outside of the
amendment's protection. A conversation between Lanza and his
brother, who was confined in a New York jail, was monitored by
the use of an electronic device secreted in the jail's visiting room.
During a subsequent legislative committee investigation of corruption in the parole system, Lanza was called upon to answer
several questions, some of which were based upon a record of the
monitored conversation which was in the committee's possession.
Lanza refused to answer the questions on the ground that, since
the interception of the conversation violated the fourth amendment, the fruits of that interception could not be used by the
committee.
Lanza's appeal to the Supreme Court from a subsequent conviction of contempt clearly could have been disposed of without
consideration of his constitutional claim; at least two of the questions he refused to answer were wholly unconnected with any
matter appearing in the record of the monitored conversation'
59. For an argument that the rule enunciated in Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964), similarly results in a loss of reliable evidence by excluding official witnesses, see Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect Massiah V.
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MiNN. L. Rrv. 47, 82 (1964).
60. 870 U.S. 189 (1962,).
61. Id. at 145. In concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and Douglas and
Chief Justice Warren would have decided the case on nonconstitutional
grounds and accordingly expressed displeasure with the majority's treatment
of the constitutional issues. Id. at 147, 152. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring,
objected only to any suggestion in the majority opinion that the fourteenth
amendment was coextensive with the fourth. Id. at 147.
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However, Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for a majority of a seven
man Court, chose to address himself to the constitutional argument. He reasoned that the jail is not an area to which the protection of the fourth amendment extends, but declined to indicate
how such an area is to be determined:
[w]ithout attempting either to define or to predict the ultimate scope
of the Fourth Amendment protection, it is obvious that a jail shares
none of the attributes of privacy of a house, an automobile, an office,
or a hotel room.6 2

The suggestion that there are physical boundaries defining
the protection of the fourth amendment, though reminiscent of
the old Olmstead analysis, is probably attributable to the Court's
quest in Silverman for "the reality of an actual intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area."6 In either case, however, the
"area" concept appears to be meaningful only if "physical intrusion" is viewed as a requisite for violation of the fourth amendment. Because it seems evident that the physical intrusion requirement cannot long be considered controlling, and because the
"area" discussion in Lanza is clearly dictum which commanded
the support of but four Justices at most, it is submitted that the
"area" limitation does not merit further consideraion in the development of a comprehensive constitutional rationale for eavesdropping.
I.

A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE

Thus far it has been suggested that, because of the inadequacies of the existing constitutional treatment of eavesdropping
and the failure of Congress or state legislatures to dispose of the
problems, the Supreme Court must reconsider the constitutional
issues raised by the use of eavesdropping techniques. Several
requisites of a suitable constitutional framework have been proposed. First, any rule limiting eavesdropping must depend for
its enforcement upon the exclusionary rule; because this remedy
concededly does not satisfactorily deter the use of eavesdropping
devices, the primary effect of any set of rules will be a gradual
moulding of police practices and public attitudes to conform with
the law. This limitation upon the effectiveness of decisions within
a constitutional framework demands that the framework furnish
guidelines of sufficient clarity to define a desirable moulding effect.
Moreover, a suitable constitutional framework must be able to
62. 370 U.s. at 143.
63. 365 U.S. at 519.
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treat a broad range of eavesdropping problems. Finally, it should
be flexible enough to accommodate any position on the merits of
eavesdropping dictated by future compilations of definitive empirical data and the sentiments of the Court.
The final concern of this Note, is to propose such a framework.
The method employed will be to consider possible constitutional
bases and to measure the utility of each against the previously
suggested criteria.
A.

TiE FMT AmNDmMNT

The argument that the first amendment furnishes a suitable
basis for the treatment of eavesdropping rests upon two assumptions. First, it is suggested that the use of eavesdropping techniques inhibits free expression by imparting to citizens a fear
that their activities will be subjected to surveillance. 4 Furthermore, the clandestine monitoring of individual activities is said
to violate a freedom to remain silent which exists concomitantly
with freedom of expression.6 5
These assertions are predicated upon the assumptions that the
first amendment guarantees the right of free expression and that
the psychological impact of eavesdropping techniques upon the
individual is such as to inhibit free expression. The first of these
assumptions appears to be arguable at best; the second can be
supported only by conjecture unverified by empirical data.
On its face, the first amendment establishes a substantive
limitation upon the legislative authority of Congress.66 It is not
immediately concerned with a private right but rather with a
public power- it prohibits the Government from interfering
with the exercise of free choice and expression by citizens in matters of politics and religion.0 7 Even though such limitations must
64. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennan,

J., dissenting); King, Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected
Contitutional Consideration, 66 DIcK. L. Rlv. 17, 25-30 (1961); King, Elec-

tronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent Developments
and Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 240, 266-67 (1964).
65. See, e.g., DouGrs, RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 134 (1958); King, Wire

Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66 Dicm. L. :Ev. 17, 29 (1961).
66. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
67. See generally Mleiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean.',
20 U. CHI. L. REv. 461 (1953).
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extend implicitly to areas of individual expression such as education, public discussion, literature, philosophy, science, and the
arts, it appears that there are many forms of communication
which, because they are wholly unconnected with activities of
governing or worshipping, are outside the scope of the first amendment.65 And it is the integrity, of these forms of communication,
principally concerning the individual's domestic affairs, which
those who would limit eavesdropping desire most to protect.
Furthermore, the recent decisions of the Court broadening the
scope of the first amendment have by no means indicated that
protection is extended to "free expression." On the contrary, it
appears that political and religious factors underly each of these
decisions.6 9
Even if a majority of the Court were disposed to interpret
the first amendment to protect "free expression," however, it
would not seem to furnish a desirable constitutional framework
for the treatment of eavesdropping. It may be assumed that a
court which could so broadly construe the first amendment would
have little difficulty recognizing the inhibiting effect of eavesdropping. But such a construction would launch the Court into
wholly uncharted waters; no discernible standards exist under
the first amendment for guiding either the judiciary or the police
under whatever limits of eavesdropping the Court may deem
appropriate. Furthermore, the bare criterion of inhibition of free
expression might well lead to inquiries as anomalous as those
produced by the rejected Olmstead bases. For example, would an
agent of the Government who attended a meeting of an allegedly
subversive organization and monitored speeches be violating a
first amendment limitation on eavesdropping only if the speaker
68. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REv. 245, 256-61.

69. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (first amendment protects right of organization
to urge members to assert legal rights through recommended lawyers); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (right of assembly of students
seeking to protest racial discrimination at state capitol protected); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (first amendment protects right of organization to provide legal counsel for its members: "In the context of NAACP
objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a
means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all
government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression."); Staub v. City
of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321 (1958) (state law inhibiting solicitation of members for any organization, union or society invalid).
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knew of the agent's presence? 70 Or would the demonstrated presence of the agent raise a presumption of inhibition of free expression sufficient to preclude the introduction of matter from
the speech at any subsequent trial? In either case, it would seem
quite probable that the speaker would be unaware of the presence
of the agent. If, however, he knew of the agent's presence before
he spoke, it is difficult to avoid the notion that he waived any
constitutional objection. Of Course, it could be argued that' free
expression is inhibited by the speaker's awareness that his conversation might be monitored and used in evidence against him,
and that all persons would speak more freely'if such a possibility
did not exist. Experience, however, appears not to support this
position, and even if the argument is assumed to have some
validity, it would apply with equal force to the divulgence in
court of the content of any conversation, whether by an eavesdropper or by a participant.
Such troublesome questions could be avoided either by interpreting the first amendment to bar all eavesdropping or by deciding the hypothetical case posed upon the "right to remain
silent" argument. Barring all eavesdropping is generally conceded
to be an unreasonable limitation upon the police function. But if
the Court were to determine on the merits of eavesdropping that
it should no longer be permitted, the suggested broad interpretation of the first amendment would seem to furnish an adequate
ground for such a pronouncement. However, urging the "right to
remain silent" adds the additional doctrinal difficulties of attempting to impress "freedom from" ideas into a concept that has
always signified "freedom to do." The first amendment generally
is associated with free access of ideas to the market place of public
discussion; the notion that clandestine communications cannot
be monitored and exposed to the public involves a curious use
of this amendment. Such additional difficulties would seem to
render the "right to remain silent" argument too tenuous to be
useful. 7 '
In summary, attempting to predicate a constitutional treatment of eavesdropping upon a "free expression" guarantee of the
first amendment presents a number of conceptual difficulties.
Even if these were resolved, it is submitted that the lack of available standards and the inherent interpretative difficulties would
70. See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme
Court, 1962 SuP. CT.REV. 212, 249-50.

71. Ibid.
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permit the first amendment to be used only if the Court were to
completely eliminate the use of eavesdropping.

B. THE FOURTH, FIFH

AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS

Arguments have been made for the treatment of eavesdropping
under various combinations of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments. The present analysis will treat the three amendments
together, for underlying all such arguments is the theory that the
fifth amendment reflects policy considerations which, when impressed into the fourth and sixth amendments, may furnish a
suitable constitutional framework for the treatment of eavesdropping.7 2

The basis for the "mystical union" of the fourth and fifth
amendments was suggested by Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v.
United States:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable
searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment throws
light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers
to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.73

Thus, the "mystical union" was originally based upon the idea
that the fifth amendment articulates a policy requiring certain
limitations upon the power of the police to elicit incriminating
evidence from the accused.74 A further incident of the theory was
the "lazy prosecutor" argument -if the prosecutor were allowed
to resort for convictions to evidence coerced from the accused
himself, 75the entire guilt-determining process would suffer
morally.
72. See, e.g., Nutting, The Fifth Amendment and Privacy, 18 U. PITT. L.
Ray. 533 (1957); Comment, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 632 (1964); Comment, 28
U. CHr. L. RFv. 664, 695-702 (1961); Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. R v. 319,

327-330 (1953).
73. 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885).
74. See Comment, 28 U. CHi. L. Rv. 664, 695 (1961); Comment, 20 U.
Cur. L. REv. 319, 327-330 (1953).
75. 8 WimoMRE, EviDeNce. § 2251, at 309 (3d ed. 1940); Nutting, supra
note 73, at 533-34.
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A similar overflow of the fifth amendment into the area of
"right to counsel" traditionally associated with the sixth amendment may be observed in the recent cases of Mas.sia v. United
State 7 6 and Escobedo v. Illinoi2 .7 In Massiah the accused was
convicted of narcotics violations on the basis of incriminating
statements obtained after indictment. Government agents secreted an electronic eavesdropping device in his car which enabled
them to monitor a conversation between the accused and a codefendant who had been released on bail pending the trial. The
Court refused to consider a possible fourth amendment violation
but reversed the conviction under a sixth amendment rationale,
holding that the incriminating statements had been illegally
solicited in the absence of counsel. Similarly in Escobedo, the
Court held that:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional rights to remain silent, the accused has
been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth
Amendment .. .s

The Massiah and Escobedo cases reflect the theory that the
sixth amendment functions not only to provide the accused with
an attorney so that he may be informed of his legal rights, but
also as a restraint upon the coercive power of the police, effective
in certain cases to bar secret inquisitions 9 Thus viewed, the sixth
amendment becomes imbued with the policies of the fifth and
would operate as a limiting factor upon the use of eavesdropping
techniques at the point where "general inquiry has began to focus
on a particular suspect."80
Without proceeding further into an analysis of the "mystical
union" arguments, it might be suggested that the policies of the
fifth amendment as impressed into the fourth and sixth would
furnish a suitable basis for the treatment of eavesdropping. While
it is true that certain limits upon eavesdropping have been thus
defined, it cannot be contended that such limits furnish suitably
76. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
77. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
78. Id. at 490-91.
79. See Comment, 32 U. CHi. L. Rav. 560, 564-72 (1965).
80. 378 U.S. at 490.
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defined guidelines for a delineation of the proper scope of eavesdropping."' Nor do these limits seem to restrict significantly police
discretion to use eavesdropping devices; only the small portion
of the possible uses of eavesdropping which operate directly to
produce evidence to be introduced in a trial of the observed party
are condemned.8 In cases in which the monitored material is
used for purposes other than the conviction of the observed
party,m these limits would have no application. Such a theory
would seem, to be appropriate only if the Court desired to allow
the police significantly more freedom than most commentators
would allow, a most unlikely position in view of the sensitivity
of the present Court to the individual rights threatened by eavesdropping.
But those who argue for an eavesdropping framework built
upon the "mystical union" seek a broader principle than that
previously suggested. The essence of their argument is that the
"mystical union" defines a general right of individual privacy. 4
Under such a theory, the legality of eavesdropping would rest
upon a determination of whether or not the sanctity of this
privacy were invaded, and, it is argued, that inquiry would be
freed from anomalous doctrines such as the law of trespass which
bear no rational relationship to the interests at stake. This position finds support in the broad language of several opinions, 5
and in a body of search and seizure cases invoking the fifth amendment."" However, the difficulties that would be encountered in
supporting and applying such a framework are substantial.
81. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).

82. See Barrett, PersonalRights, Property Rights, and the FourthAmendment, 1960 Sin'. CT. REV. 46. The effectiveness of a constitutional right predicated upon the fifth amendment is limited by the judicial remedy, the exclusionary rule. See notes 17 & 19, supra, and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfine, 174 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1959)
(monitored material used to propound questions in legislative committee);
People v. Lewis, 214 Cal. App. 2d 799, 29 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1963) (monitored
material used as basis for search of premises.)
84. See Beaney, supra note 71, at 212; authority cited note 73, supra.
85. E.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 446 (1963) (Brennan, I.,
dissenting; joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ.); Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

86. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (federal exclusionary rule);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (federal exclusionary rule);
Gambino v. United States, 273 U.S. 310 (1927) (invalidity of searches not
involving private papers); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (invalidity of searches for merely evidentiary material).
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First, the basic argument that there exists a "mystical union"
between the fourth and fifth amendments which defines a right
to privacy is generally viewed as quite mystical in itself. Commentators who have examined the concept since its articulation
by Mr. Justice Bradley have been unable to perceive the intimate
relationship which he detected.8 7 But it is hardly an insight to
observe that such doctrinal difficulties have proved to be of little
moment to a determined Court.8 8
A more serious difficulty is encountered in applying a constitutional framework embodying the concept of "privacy." Again, if
the Court were determined to eliminate all eavesdropping, the
result could be rationalized acceptably by deeming every eavesdropping technique an invasion of privacy protected by the fourth
and fifth amendments. However, if the Court were to take a less
extreme position and permit eavesdropping under some, but not
all, circumstances, judicial inquiry and police behavior would be
furnished with no discernible guidelines, and decisions would be
made to turn upon a concept which the Court has steadfastly
failed to clarify. Arguably the Court could not define "privacy";
because the term has been given a variety of meanings in a multitude of situations, the magnitude of the body of law which the
Court would be required to reexamine to formulate a definition
would make such an effort quite impractical, if not impossible.
Search and seizure decisions under the fourth amendment would
be of little value because they are predicated for the most part
upon a construction of the fourth amendment which rejects the
concept of a right to privacy. In summary, then, the "mystical
union" would seem to furnish a suitable basis for the treatment
of eavesdropping only if eavesdropping techniques were to be
universally condemned or if the Court were to undertake a concomitant definition of "privacy," which is quite unlikely.
87. See 8 WIGmORE, EvmENcn § 2261, (McNaughton rev. 1961); Corwin,
The Supreme (ourt's Construction of the Self-Incriminatiom Clause, 29 MicH.
L. REv. 1, 16 (1930); Meltzer, Required Records, the Mcarran.Act, and the
Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHi.L. I~v. 687, 699-701 (1951);
Comment, 28 U. Cmr. L. Rnv. 664, 695 (1961).
88. Even Mr. Justice Frankfurter has resorted to a finesse:
[T]wo protections emerge from the broad constitutional proscription of
official invasion. The first of these is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy .... Certainly it is not necessary to accept
any particular theory of the interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments to realize what history makes plain ....
Frank v. Maryland, 859 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
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The argument that eavesdropping techniques might be dealt

with under the due process provisions of the Constitution was
suggested by Circuit Judge Washington in his dissenting opinion
in Silverman v. United States. 9 He conceded that the use of the
spike microphone was not in violation of the fourth amendment
because of the lack of an "actual trespass":
But it does violate, I think, our fundamental concept of ordered liberty,
as embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.... Under a governmental system of constitutional or
limited exercise of public power, ordered liberty requires that the police,
like other public officials, take action against a citizen only pursuant to
duly-conferred authority.90
Judge Washington envisaged a constitutional framework for
the treatment of eavesdropping in which wiretapping and traditional techniques would be left to their fate under the fourth
amendment, but techniques of electronic surveillance would be

prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth amendments unless the
police could justify their use by statutory authority or some
undefined showing of necessityY'
Such an analysis is said to rest primarily upon the language
of three Supreme Court decisions: Palko v. Connecticut,9 2 Rochin
v. California,3 and Irvine v. California.4 However, each of these
cases reflects a somewhat different inquiry into the scope of due
process. In Palko it was contended that a state appeal in a criminal case deprived the accused of due process; the inquiry undertaken by the Court was whether or not explicit provisions of the
fifth amendment, such as the double jeopardy provision, were
incorporated into the fourteenth. The Court concluded that they
were not because:
[T]hey are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To
abolish them is not to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' 95

89. 275 F.2d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

90. Ibid.; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548--55 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
91. 275 F.2d at 179.
92. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
93. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
94. 847 U.s. 128 (1954).
95. 302 U.S. at 325.
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In Rochin, a narcotics conviction in which morphine capsules
forcibly extracted from the stomach of the accused were used in
evidence was reversed under a fourteenth amendment guarantee
of rights not even suggested in the Constitution -the stomach
pumping was regarded as a denial of due process because it was
shocking to the conscience and abhorrent to well established
principles of justice. 6 In this sense, due process may be extended
to include principles of natural law not enshrined in the Bill of
Rights. Again in Irvine, no explicit provision of the Bill of
Rights was involved; nonetheless, the Court found that due
process embodied a "fundamental principle" of the fourth amendment, "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police."9 8
The first of these inquiries, suggested by Palko, is unsatisfactory for a treatment of eavesdropping because it would look
to provisions of the fourth amendment, which concededly have
not been construed to forbid the use of electronic eavesdropping
devices. The last, suggested by Irvine, suffers from the same limitations as the proposed "mystical union" basis- it is keyed to
a definition of privacy which has not yet been supplied; thus
it would seem to be practical only if the Court would seek total
elimination of eavesdropping. The second inquiry, articulated in
Rochin, would leave the status of eavesdropping under the Constitution even more uncertain; not even the meandering "privacy"
discussions of the Court would be available for guidance by
analogy.
A further difficulty in Judge Washington's analysis lies in its
failure to treat the range of eavesdropping techniques within a
consistent framework; analysis of traditional eavesdropping and
wiretapping would remain under the fourth amendment but electronic devices would be separately condemned. Anomalous results
might be obtained where, for example, the same telephone conversation is monitored by a wiretap and by a transmitter or
recorder secreted upon the telephone. Similarly, it is difficult to
rationalize a distinction between an informer's testimony as to
conversations in which he was a participant and the same testimony revealed by a recorder which had been concealed upon his
96. 842 U.S. at 172.
97. See generally Henkln, "Selective Incorporation." in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 73 YALE L.fT. 74 (1963).
98. 347 U.S. at 132. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v.
Colorado, 838 U.S. 25 (1949).
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person 9 This distinction becomes even more troublesome when
it is realized that the accused is at least as likely as the Government to suffer from the inaccuracies of the informer's memory.
Finally, it is not at all evident that the use of electronic eavesdropping techniques violates the fundamentals of "ordered
liberty." The effects of eavesdropping have not been established
conclusively, and "ordered liberty" is without a clear definition;
hence, it might well be argued that any such judgment could
reflect only the subjective reactions of nine Justices. However,
certain objective criteria are visible in due process adjudication; 00
in determining whether a certain concept is a fundamental of
ordered liberty, the Court has examined previous moral judgments- found in the opinions of the framers of the Constitution,10 1 state legislative decisions, 10 2 opinions of American
courts, 10 3 and laws of foreign countries 10 4 - moral propositions of
unquestioned acceptance as fundamentals of ordered liberty from
which it can logically be deduced that the concept in question is
also fundamental,0 5 and procedures of tyrannical governments
which are unquestionably the antithesis of ordered liberty. 0 6
If any conclusion is indicated by previous moral judgments,
it is that ordered liberty does not demand a closer limitation
upon the use of eavesdropping techniques than that which is
presently derived from the fourth amendment. Opinions of the
framers are, of course, nonexistent. However, only six states
prohibit the use of electronic eavesdropping techniques,' 07 whereas
99. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); cf. Lopez v. United
States, 873 U.S. 427 (1963).

100. The analysis pursued here was suggested in Kadish, Methodology and
Criteriain Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YA=E L.J.
319 (1957).
101. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
102. See, e.g., Bute v. Illinois, 33 U.S. 640 (1948); Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 46-65 (1942).
103. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
104. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 199 (1953) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
105. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (right to be present
at jury view deduced from right to be present throughout trial); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel deduced from right to hearing).
106. See, e.g., Shaughmessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
217-18 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948);
Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
107. CAL. PEN. ConE § 653h-j; In.. REv. STAT. Ol. 88, § 14.1-.7 (1963);
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thirty-six restrict wiretapping 8 - which the due process framework proposed by Judge Washington would not encompass.
Statutory limits upon police practices by foreign jurisdictions
generally allow at least as much freedom in the use of eavesdropping techniques as the fourth amendment; moreover, these
jurisdictions, virtually without exception, reject the exclusionary
rule and permit the introduction of evidence into a trial without
regard for the manner in which it was obtained. 10 9
It appears that there exist moral principles deemed fundamentals of ordered liberty from which may be deduced the proposition that ordered liberty also demands the prohibition of
electronic surveillance. "Privacy,"" 0 "free speech,"''- and the
freedom from self-incrimination 2 are but three of these principles. However, as has been stated, predicating a constitutional
framework for the treatment of eavesdropping upon these principles, without a clear elucidation of their boundaries, would
leave the treatment of eavesdropping without suitable guidelines
of course, the utilization of eavesdropping techniques
-unless,
were universally prohibited.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.650
(1963); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 738; OaRE. REv. STAT. § 165.540(1)(c) (Supp. 1963).
108. ALA. CODE tit. 48, § 414 (1958); ALAsKA STAT, § 42.20.100 (1962);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-1810 (1957); CAL. PEN. CODE § 640; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 40-4-17 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-140 (1958); DEL. CODE ANNi.
tit. 11, § 757 (Supp. 1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 822.10 (1965); HAWAI REV.
LAws § 309 A-1 (Supp. 1963); IDAno CODE ANN. §§ 18-6704, 18-6705 (1947);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 16 (1963); IowA CODE § 716.8 (1962); Ky. Rnv.
STAT. § 433.480 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:329 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art.
35, §§ 92, 98 (1957); MAfss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1964); MICE. STAT.
ANN. § 28.808 (1954); MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 94-3203 (Supp. 1965); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 86-S28 (1958); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 200.620, 200.630 (1963); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:146-1 (1953); N.. STAT. ANN. § 40A-12-1 (1964); N.Y. PEN.
LAw § 738; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 8-10-07
(1959); OmIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4931.28 (Page 1953); OELA. STAT. tit. 21, §
1757 (1961); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(1) (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2443
(1958); RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-35-19 (1956); S.D. CODE § 13.4519 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-2117 (1955); UTAir CODE ANN. § 76-48-11 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-156 (Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. § 134.39 (1963); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 37-259 (1957).
109. See POLICE PowEl A

INDIrmUAL FREEDOm 104-28 (Sowle ed. 1962).

110. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Allen, Federalism
and the Fourth Amendment A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1;
Beaney, supra note 70 at 246-50.
111. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
112. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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It is obvious that constant surveillance by all available eavesdropping techniques is an incident of totalitarianism. However,
this is at best a weak basis for concluding that prohibition of
electronic surveillance is demanded by ordered liberty - at least
in the absence of a clearly defined cause-effect relationship between the abhorrent aspects of totalitarianism and its use of
surveillance. It might be argued with equal plausibility that
ordered liberty demands the dissolution of police organizations
and militia groups.
In summary, although a due process framework would preserve flexibility in treating the problems of eavesdropping, avoid
the analysis of electronic eavesdropping techniques in the
anomalous framework of the Olmstead rationale, and preserve the
fourth amendment treatment of traditional eavesdropping techniques, its failure to provide suitably defined guidelines to furnish
a comprehensive framework for the treatment of the entire range
of eavesdropping techniques considerably restricts its utility.
D.

THE FOURTH AMENDAMNT

The constitutional framework suggested is predicated upon a
construction of the fourth amendment giving recognition to the
independent significance of the reasonableness and warrants
clauses. Such a construction is not novel; it was propounded by
the Court in United States v. Rabinowitz," 3 to validate a warrantless search incident to arrest 1 4
Under this construction, eavesdropping techniques would be
judged by both clauses; the warrant framework of traditional
113. 39 U.S. 56 (1950).
114.
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured
whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of
easy administration. But we cannot agree that this requirement
should be crystallized into a sine qua non the reasonableness of a
search.... The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure
a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.
Id. at 65-66. There is little historical gloss upon the fourth amendment. See
ANNALS OF CoNGaRss 783, 808-09 (1789); LAssoN, HISTORY mD DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

FOURTH AwDMNT

TO THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION

102 n.86 (1937). Early commentators, however, read the warrants clause as a
sine qua non of reasonableness, and, in addition, as a requirement that warranted searches be conducted reasonably. See, e.g., COoLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LnTATIONS 299-308 (1868); BLscK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 435-42 (1895).
See generally LAssoN, op. cit. supra, at 13-105; Reynard, Freedom From
UnreasonableSearch and Seizure - A Second Class ConstitutionalRight?, 25
IND. LJ. 259 (1950); Comment, 28 U. CH. L. REV. 664, 678-80 (1961).
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eavesdropping would be preserved, and the constitutionality of
modern eavesdropping techniques would be tested by the reasonableness of their utilization in a given situation. Such a framework would rid fourth amendment interpretation of the anomalous survival of the Olmstead construction, would permit decisions
which comport with the rejection of the lines of analysis suggested
by that construction, and would be far more consonant with recent decisions espousing a broader interpretation of the fourth
amendment in related areas of search and seizure." 5 Furthermore,
it would permit the Court to make a determination upon the
merits as eavesdropping practices come before it, while preserving the flexibility necessary to adjust its determinations of reasonableness as future compilations of empirical data dictate
different conclusions.
The arguments against this redefinition of the fourth amendment are corollaries of a main objection that it likewise places
eavesdropping in a limbo of unfettered judicial discretion. It is
submitted, however, that adequate guidelines for both judicial
and police treatment of eavesdropping techniques are provided
through a fairly well defined "calculus of reasonableness" suggested by the Court in Frank v. Maryland"" and by analogy to
the requisites of the warrants clause.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Frank,
suggested three determinants of the reasonableness of searches
and seizures under the fourth amendment: the seriousness of the
invasion of individual "liberty" or "privacy," the probability
that the search would reveal the matter sought, and the importance of the public need by which the invasion was sought to be
justified." 7 With slight modification, these factors may be used
to determine the reasonableness of the utilization of a given
eavesdropping technique.
The first of the determinants leads immediately into the
quagmire of "privacy." Definitional difficulties with the use of this
term could be minimized, however, by predicating the inquiry
into reasonableness upon the assumption that the primary purpose in limiting the use of eavesdropping is expressed in the
proposition that "the fundamental requirement of a free society
is that the official use of force must be subject to other checks8
than the discretion of law enforcement officials themselves.""1
115. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
116. 859 U.S. 360 (1959).
117. See id. at S66, 371.
118. Paulsen, Safeguards in tke Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. UL.
REv. 65 (1957).
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Under this assumption, the basic inquiry is not whether the use
of eavesdropping techniques infringes upon the individual's
"privacy." Rather, the inquiry is whether the boundaries of permissible eavesdropping constitute a reasonable limitation upon
the discretionary use of police power. Such an inquiry is admittedly but the obverse of that based upon "individual privacy";
however, by working from an assumption that the police function
must be subject to certain limitations, substantially the same
interests are examined without facing either the difficulty of
determining what are the boundaries of "privacy" or the apparent
futility of asking the Court to furnish a definition of "privacy."
A determination of the reasonableness of a utilization of eavesdropping techniques would, then, balance four factors: the nature
and range of individual conduct that the techniques would permit
the police to observe; the likelihood that the permitted observation of individual conduct would reveal the information sought;
the likelihood that observation of a narrower range of conduct
would have produced similar information; and the importance
of the public need by which the observation was sought to be
justified.
By the use of these determinants, the Court could provide a
rational framework for whatever position on the merits of eavesdropping it might choose to take. The universal unconstitutionality of eavesdropping could be reached by simply deeming the
observation too onerous to be justified by any public need. Intermediate positions would be judged by the interplay of these
determinants. For example, any sort of electronic eavesdropping
device installed in a home or apartment would allow the police
discretion to observe the broadest possible range of individual
conduct. The use of such a device could be validated only by a
showing of the most essential public need and an overwhelming
probability that the information sought could not be obtained
by observing a narrower range of conduct than the individual in
his home. It seems inconceivable that such a situation would exist,
because if enough were known of the individual's behavior to show
the probability of obtaining evidence in this manner, then evidence sufficient to convict him should be easily obtainable in
other ways. In a less extreme case, suppose a policeman staked
out near the home of suspected gamblers peers through the
transom when he hears the sound of adding machines, known to
him to be used in the tabulation of policy cards. He observes the
gamblers surrounded by such cards, and testifies accordingly at a
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subsequent trial." 9 Next, suppose the police, suspecting the same
men of gambling, conceal a television camera near their house.
The camera similarly scans the room through the transom and
records the tabulation of policy cards upon video tape, which is
introduced in evidence at a subsequent trial. In assessing the reasonableness of each of these techniques of eavesdropping, it is
clear that the public need by which the eavesdropping may be
justified is the same. The range of conduct which the police may
observe is, however, much broader in the case of the camera than
in the case of the policeman; the policeman may stand upon a
chair at the transom only for a short time without arousing the
suspicion of those inside, whereas the secreted camera may observe
their conduct without their knowledge for days. Furthermore, the
probability that the policeman will observe the policy operation
without viewing much unrelated conduct is great because of the
immediate circumstances. The camera, however, cannot turn itself
on only when the sound of adding machines emanates from the
room; thus, the possibility of police observation of much unrelated
conduct is very much greater than in the case of the policeman.
Moreover, there is little likelihood that the policeman could have
observed the illegal operation by a technique of eavesdropping
which would have scanned a narrower range of conduct. Thus,
the eavesdropping of the policeman would be considerably more
reasonable than the eavesdropping of the camera. If the policeman had carried the camera, however, each method would be
equally reasonable; there would then be no rational ground for
excluding the video tape merely because it revealed evidence
which was obtained by the use of an electronic eavesdropping
device rather than through the human senses alone.
The guidance furnished by the determinants suggested above
is augmented by analogy to the requisites specified in the warrants clause. Upon the assumption that the procedures enumerated in the warrants clause are reasonable, the use of an eavesdropping technique accompanied by procedures which impose
similar limitations upon the police function should be equally
reasonable.' ° Moreover, the basic warrant requirements are
familiar to the judiciary and to the police, whose actions must
be guided by the constitutional framework adopted.
119. For a similar fact situation, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.

451 (1948).
120. See generally Comment, 28 U. Cni. L. REv. 664, 686-92 (1961),
where this analysis is used to examine the equivalence of protection in a
search with a warrant and a search incident to arrest.
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Most notable of the warrants clause requisites is probable
cause, which is designed to guarantee the likelihood that observation will produce the matter sought. Since this requirement is
also one of the suggested determinants of reasonableness, there
should be no difficulty in assimilating the standards of probable
cause derived from existing search and seizure precedent. However, the use of some eavesdropping techniques portends a much
broader exercise of police discretion than traditional search and
seizure; therefore, it would seem that the existing standards of
probable cause should function as a minimum standard for valid
employment of these techniques.
A second requisite of the warrants clause is particularity of
description. This limitation is intended to prevent general fishing
expeditions where entry is gained ostensibly to obtain one item
and the search becomes a general one for evidence of any
offense.121 The use of modern eavesdropping techniques obviously
infringes upon this limitation because they are necessarily indiscriminate in the conduct which they observe. Thus, it would
seem that the requirement of particularity, if strictly enforced
as a criterion of reasonableness, would sharply limit if not forbid
the utilization of electronic surveillance devices. Even strict observance may not, however, prevent their employment in certain
locations. To cite one example, where a telephone is tapped in an
office which the police strongly suspect is being used as the headquarters of a gambling operation, the chances of monitoring
matter unrelated to the purpose justifying the wiretap is at a
minimum. Moreover, police can usually obtain additional warrants to seize objects which they observe while present to seize
a particular unrelated item. 22 It might thus be argued that observing the particularity limitation inhibits exercise of police discretion only to the extent of requiring a second trip to the magistrate. However, since the magistrate must then judge the good
faith and reasonableness of the successive searches and seizures
in the light of the original limited purpose, it would seem that an
initial judgment of the reasonableness of a utilization of eavesdropping techniques would provide similar restraints upon the
police function.
The final requisite of the warrants clause is prior approval by
a magistrate. There should be little difficulty in devising suitable
121. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 US. 217, 225-80 (1960).
122. See Comment, 28 U. CHr. L. Rv. 664, 689-90 (1961).
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provisions for submission of plans to eavesdrop to a magistrate. 3
It may, in fact, be desirable to deem such prior approval a sine
qua non of reasonableness in the case of electronic eavesdropping
techniques. This requirement, coupled with a stricter demonstration of probable cause and a location suitably limited by the
particularity requirement, would seem to furnish procedures
which would place limitations upon the police function with
respect to the range of eavesdropping techniques equally as reasonable and well defined as those now provided in the case of
traditional eavesdropping techniques by the requisites of the
warrants clause.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In concluding that the fourth amendment furnishes an adequate constitutional basis for the treatment of eavesdropping,
other constitutional amendments were severally analyzed and
compared. However, certain additional incidents of the suggested
rationale appear from an interplay of the fourth amendment with
those other provisions.
First, it appears that the reasonableness analysis is bounded
by the Massiah-Escobedoright to counsel rationale. Thus, at the
point where "general inquiry... has begun to focus on a particular suspect,"'2 4 the fifth and sixth amendment limitation upon
police conduct dictates an absolute prohibition of the use of
eavesdropping devices," 5 thereby rendering a reasonableness
analysis immaterial. Second, the suggested construction of the
fourth amendment and the guidelines it entails would automatically be included in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and thus extended to the states.' 2 Finally, it would
seem that a theory of waiver of protection by consent, a general
limitation upon the individual's protection under the Bill of
Rights, would also limit the application of the suggested analysis.
For example, such a theory would be useful in disposing of the
On Lee-Lopez problem where one party to a conversation has
consented to its monitoring by an electronic device. But because
123. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464-65 (1963) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 140 n.6 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
124. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
125. Compare People v. Jones, 47 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), with
People v. Flores, 46 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
126. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643 (1961).
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the suggested fourth amendment analysis is predicated upon a
limitation of the police function rather than an invasion of individual rights, it might be suggested that consent by the individual should be immaterial. 2 7 To avoid any such difficulty, the use
of the informer could itself be viewed as the utilization of an
eavesdropping technique and its reasonableness in the circumstances determined by the suggested analysis without regard for
any additional monitoring of the conversation by concealed electronic devices. Regardless of the Court's disposition of such eavesdropping issues, however, it seems that the fourth amendment
provides the most suitable framework for analysis.
127. Cf. Comment, 32 U. CH. L. Rnv. 560, 573-79 (1965).

